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1. Introduction
[The] 90-minute documentary [Wanderlust] ... was also a window into
the frustrations of making a clip-intensive film dependent on copyright
clearance, which has become hugely expensive in the past decade. Initial
quotations for the necessary sequences came to more than $450,000, which
would have raised by half the cost of the IFC film. ... “Paramount wanted
$20,000 for 119 seconds of Paper Moon”, Ms. Sams said. “The studios are
so afraid of exploitation that they set boundaries no one will cross. Even
after the prices were cut, we were $150,000 in the hole.”1
Cumulative innovation and creativity, whereby new work build upon old, is a pervasive
phenomenon. However, it was not until recently that it received significant attention in
the literature. The seminal paper in this regard is that of Green and Scotchmer (1995).
They introduced a two-stage innovation model in which the second innovation is enabled
by, or builds upon, the first. Their paper primarily concerns itself with how rents are
divided between innovators at the two stages, in particular with the extent to which the
first innovator is (under-)compensated for her contribution (the option value) to the second
innovation. They investigate how different policy levers related to intellectual property
rights, in particular breadth2, could be used to affect the bargaining (or its absence)
between different innovators and hence the resulting payoffs.
A central feature of their model, as well as subsequent work that extended it (such
as Scotchmer (1996)), was an assumption that knowledge of costs and returns, whether
deterministic or stochastic, was shared equally by innovators at different stages (i.e. was
common knowledge). With common knowledge all mutually beneficial transactions are
concluded, using ex ante licenses where necessary to avoid the possibility of hold-up of
second-stage innovators.
This assumption, however, is problematic. If all innovators share the same information
why do we need different innovators at first and second stages and why concern ourselves
1The New York Times, May 28, 2006 No Free Samples for Documentaries: Seeking Film Clips With the
Fair-Use Doctrine.
2A monopoly right (intellectual property right) such as a patent or a copyright confers the right to exclude
not simply direct copies but also products that are sufficiently similar. The term lagging/leading breath
are often used to denote the space of inferior/superior (respectively) products that are excluded by the
patent/copyright (i.e. taken as infringing the monopoly).
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with licenses and bargaining if a single innovator could just as easily do it all? The obvious
answer is that this assumption is wrong, something suggested by a cursory observation of
reality: many different firms engage in innovation precisely because they have specialized
skills and knowledge that make it effective for them rather than another firm to engage in
a given area.3 Thus, in this paper we investigate cumulative innovation under asymmet-
ric information, for example, where a first-stage innovator only has a probabilistic prior
over the second-stage innovator’s cost/values but the second-stage innovator knows them
precisely4.
Our paper takes as a starting point a ‘basic’ model very similar to that presented
by Bessen (2004).5 Second-stage firms are of two types (high and low value) with the
type unobserved by first-stage innovators. With (strong) IP first-stage firms may require
second-stage innovators to pay a royalty while with (weak) IP second-stage firms may
produce without having to license from first-stage firms. As first-stage firms do not know
the type of given second-stage innovator with (strong) IP there may be ‘licensing failure’
(that is the royalty may be set above the level that a second-stage firm is willing to pay).6
Thus, there is a trade-off: with IP more first-stage innovation takes place due to the extra
royalty income received by first-stage firms but some second-stage innovation may be lost
as a result of ‘licensing failure’ due to high royalty rates.
Such a trade-off is already familiar in the literature and our main reason for presenting
it is to provide a benchmark and basis for the more complex ‘sampling’ model presented
in the second section. The ‘sampling’ model extends the first by introducing the idea of
3See e.g. Eisenberg and Heller (1998); Hall and Ziedonis (2001); Cockburn (2005).
4Of course, for consistency, the collective distribution of the values/costs of all second-stage innovators
should correspond to the prior of the first innovator.
5We differ from Bessen slightly in that his focus is primarily on whether ex ante or ex post licensing occurs.
Central to this analysis is his introduction of ex post royalty shares which are the royalty shares that take
place in the absence of licensing. These are determined exogenously – perhaps as a policy variable or
determined by invent-around costs and other factors – and Bessen shows that the socially optimal ex post
royalty share is less than that obtained in ex ante bargaining (and so all licensing should occur ex post).
By contrast, in our model we do not have the concept of an ex post royalty share: either a second-stage
innnovator obtains a license or she does not (and so then cannot produce).
6We note that Bessen uses the term ‘holdup’ to denote what we term ‘licensing failure’. Since he is
considering ex-ante licensing his use of the term ‘hold-up’ differs somewhat from the traditional usage as
there are no sunk relationship-specific investments (a binding contract is possible ex-ante). Rather the
‘hold-up’ is simply that, just like a monopolist facing heterogeneous consumers, a first-stage innovator is
facing a set of second-stage innovators with private and heterogeneous values and so may set a profit-
maximizing royalty rate that excludes some second-stage innovators from licensing. Since, the ‘sampling’
case we discuss below resembles more closely a traditional ‘hold-up’ situation we prefer to reserve that
term for use there and to to use ‘licensing failure’ for the situation described here.
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sampling, that is that second-stage firms engage in some form of (costly) effort prior to the
point that any kind of royalty setting and licensing takes place. Imagine, for example, that
a second-stage innovator must search out, trial and experiment with, (many) first-stage
innovations prior to deciding which first-stage innovation they can, or want to, use (and
therefore license). Furthermore, the more products they sample, the more likely it is a
second-stage firm comes up with a good idea of its own (or a good match between its idea
and existing ideas or products on which it can build) – which is modelled, in this case, by
the firm’s innovation being of high, rather than of low, net value (net, that is, of costs).
Classic real-world examples of such a situation can be found in the software and music
industries. In software a new application will likely combine many ideas (and even code)
from previous products. But ideas can only come from applications that one has encoun-
tered.7 In music, particularly modern music, re-use either explicit or implicit is ubiquitous.
For example, in dance and hip-hop, ‘sampling’, whereby a small section of a previous work
is directly copied and then repeated or reworked in some manner, is the very basis of the
genre. More generally all composers whether classical or modern use previous musical,
ideas, motifs, and melodies as parts of new works8.
Sampling benefits a firm by increasing the probability of having a high value innovation
but it is costly. As it takes place prior to any kind of royalty negotiation it may lead to
hold-up: the hold-up of the sampling effort. As a result the presence of IP rights that
require second-stage innovators to license may now have another cost in addition to that
from traditional ‘licensing failure’: fearing high royalty rates second-stage firms will reduce
the level of sampling they do and thereby reduce the average quality of second-stage in-
novations. Because this effect operates across all second-stage innovators its consequences
for welfare may be substantially greater than the traditional ‘licensing failure’ problem
(which only affects low value second-stage innovators).
Turning to the comparative statics, we find that, in general, the lower the sampling costs
or the larger the differential between high and low value second-stage innovations, the more
likely it is that a regime without intellectual property rights will be preferable. Thus, in
7We should distinguish here between reuse of ideas and reuse of code. With software copyright but no
software patents one would (within limits) be free to reuse the ideas found in existing applications. However,
reuse of the code itself would require that the software be open-source.
8See e.g. Malcolm Gladwell, The New Yorker, 2004-11-22, Something Borrowed: Should a charge of pla-
giarism ruin your life?, also http://www.low-life.fsnet.co.uk/copyright/part3.htm#copyrightinfringement
for information about sampling in dance and hip-hop music.
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the context of this model, technological change which reduces the cost of encountering and
trialling new ‘ideas’ should imply a reduction in the socially optimal level of intellectual
property rights such as patents and copyright.
This approach therefore adds another dimension to the question of how profit is divided
between innovators at different stages. Seen in this light, it also has direct analogies
with existing results related to the question of whether second-stage innovations should
be infringing (I) or non-infringing (NI). For example, Denicolo (2000), who extends Green
and Scotchmer’s model with patent races at each stage, finds that in some circumstances it
will be better to make second-stage innovations non-infringing (in this model one trades off
faster second-stage innovation with non-infringement against faster first-stage innovation
when there is infringement).
It also has a close connection to the recent work of Bessen and Maskin (2006). Similar
to this paper they investigate the welfare impact of ‘licensing failure’ due to asymmetric
information in a model of cumulative innovation. Similar to us they show that, with
cumulative innovation, in contrast to what occurs in a ‘one-shot’ model, IP may, in some
circumstances, reduce rather than increase innovation (and social welfare). However their
focus is rather different from ours (complementarities in research rather than sampling)
and their results arise for different reasons. Specifically, in their model there are multiple
stages with (the same) two firms at each stage. Each may choose to participate or not in
researching the current innovation and the next innovation stage is reached if, and only
if, research at the current stage is successful, with success an increasing function of the
number of participating firms. As a result their is an ‘externality’ from participation in a
given stage: though the value of success at the current stage accrues only to the winning
firm by enabling subsequent stages (some of which may be won by the other firm) success
also increases the other firms expected revenue. As a result, when one firm is excluded
from subsequent stages due to ‘licensing failure’ under an IP regime the effect on welfare
can be far more severe than in the one-stage case.
Finally, we should point out that our results are of relevance to a variety of recent policy
debates. For example, in December 2006 the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property which
had been setup by the UK government to examine the UK’s current IP regime, provided,
as one its recommendations (no. 11), that “Directive 2001/29/EC [the EU Copyright
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‘InfoSoc’ Directive] be amended to allow for an exception for creative, transformative or
derivative works, within the parameters of the Berne Three Step Test.” Such a ‘transfor-
mative use exception’ would correspond very closely to the weak/no IP regime considered
in the model presented here. Meanwhile in 2005 in the United States, the Supreme Court
in Merck KGaA v. Integra Life Sciences I, Ltd 9 created a very broad research exemption
in relation to pre-clinical R&D. Such a change again corresponds closely in the model to
a move towards a weak/no IP regime in which a second-stage product would not infringe
on a first-stage firm’s patent.
2. A Basic Model of Two-Stage Cumulative Innovation
2.1. The Model. We adopt a simple model of two stage innovation in which the sec-
ond innovation builds upon the first in some manner – either as an application or as an
extension of it. All agents are risk-neutral and act to maximize profits.
Innovations are described by their net value v (revenue minus costs). Because our
interest lies in examining the trade-off between innovation at different stages we make no
distinction between social and private value (i.e. there are no deadweight losses) and v
may be taken to be both.
We assume the base (first) innovation takes two values: low (vL1 ) and high (v
H
1 ) with
probability p, (1−p) respectively. We assume that vL1 < 0 so that without some additional
source of revenue, for example from licensing (see below), the innovation will not be
produced. High value innovations have positive stand-alone value, vH1 > 0, and so do not
require an outside source of revenue in order to be profitable.
Second-stage innovations also take two values: low (vL2 ) and high (v
H
2 ) with probability
q, (1 − q) respectively and vH2 > vL2 > 0. While the value of a second-stage innovation is
known to the innovator who produces it, the value is not known to the owner of the first-
stage innovation which it builds upon (this could occur because of imperfect information
regarding revenue, costs or both). Without loss of generality we shall assume that the
number (or measure) of second-stage innovations per first-stage innovation is one (having
N second-stage innovations per first-stage innovation would just require replacing vH2 with
NvH2 and v
L
2 with Nv
L
2 ). We also assume that v
L
1 + v
L
2 ≥ 0 – this ensures that whatever
9The full opinion is available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/04slipopinion.html.
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the value of q the overall value generated by a first-stage innovation is positive (the overall
value is the stand-alone plus the value of dependent second-stage innovations).10
2.1.1. Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing. We wish to consider two regimes: one
with (strong) intellectual property rights (IP) and one with weak, or no intellectual prop-
erty rights (NIP). With intellectual property rights every second-stage innovator will re-
quire a license from the relevant first-stage innovator in order to market her product, while
without intellectual property rights she may market freely without payment or licence.11
We assume that the direct returns to the first innovator (v1) are unaffected by the
intellectual property rights regime. This assumption is not as strong as it first appears
since simple business stealing, in which the total combined rents of the two stages remain
unchanged, could be incorporated into this model simply by increasing p, the proportion
of first stage innovations that are low value.12 Of course, if there is rent dissipation, due,
say to further product market competition, this would not be the case and a richer model
would be required. Given our need to keep the analysis tractable, and that the focus in
this paper is on the division of rents between first and second-stage innovators, we do not
take this approach, though we do return to the matter briefly in the conclusion.
Finally, we take the licence to define a lump-sum royalty payment r. This assumption
is without loss of generality since, in this model, an innovation is entirely defined by its
net value v and there are no other attributes available to use in designing a mechanism
to discriminate between types of second-stage innovator.13 The royalty is set ex-ante,
that is prior to the second-stage innovator’s decision to invest, and is in the form of a
take-it-or-leave it offer by the first-stage innovator.
2.1.2. Sequence of Actions. The sequence of actions in the model is:
(1) Nature determines the value type of the first-stage innovator.
10Allowing values of vL1 less than v
L
2 does not alter the analysis in any significant way but brings extra
complexity to the statement and proof of propositions.
11Given that we are dealing with cumulative innovation some readers might prefer the infringing (I) vs.
non-infringing (NI) dichotomy with its implication of a distinction between ‘horizontal’ imitation and
‘vertical’ improvement of a product.
12The assumption would also be valid in the case where there is little substitution between the first and
second-stage innovation. For example, where the first innovation is a tool used in developing the second-
stage innovation.
13For example, there are no quantities on which to base a non-linear pricing scheme (fixed fee plus per unit
fee royalty). For the same reason there is no opportunity to use type-contingent menus, or any other form
of more complex licensing agreement, to increase total royalty income by discriminating between high and
low value innovators.
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Player Second-Stage Innovator
First Stage
Innovator
Value Type Low (q) High (1-q)
Action NI I NI I
Low (p)
r
vL1 , 0 v
L
1 + r , v
L
2 − r vL1 , 0 vL1 + r , vH2 − r
High (1-p) vH1 , 0 v
H
1 + r, v
L
2 − r vH1 , 0 vH1 + r , vH2 − r
Table 1. Action and Payoff Matrix Assuming First-Stage Innovator In-
vests. (I/NI = Invest/Do Not Invest, r = Royalty Rate)
(2) A first-stage innovator decide whether to invest. If the first-stage innovator does
not invest the game ends and all payoffs are zero. Assuming the first-stage inno-
vator invests the game continues.
(3) The first-stage innovator sets the royalty rate r (under the no/weak IP regime
second-stage innovations do not infringe and so the de facto royalty rate is 0).
(4) Nature determines the value type of a second-stage innovator.
(5) Given this royalty rate second-stage firms decide whether to invest.
(6) Payoffs are realized.
The action/payoff matrix is summarized in Table 1.
2.2. Solving the Model. Define a constant, α, as follows:
α ≡ v
H
2 − vL2
vH2
Proposition 2.1. With intellectual property rights, the game defined above has the fol-
lowing Subgame Perfect Nash equilibria. A second-stage innovator invests if and only if its
realized value is greater than or equal to the royalty rate (i.e. net profits are non-negative).
A first-stage innovator invests and sets a low royalty rate (RL), rL = vL2 if the probability
of a low value innovation (q) is greater than α and a high royalty rate (RH) rH = vH2 if
q ≤ α. When q = α the first-stage innovator may set any royalty of the form rL with
probability x and rH with probability 1 − x, x ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, there always exist a pure
strategy equilibrium and except when q = α, this equilibrium is unique.
Proof. See appendix. 
Proposition 2.2. Without intellectual property rights the game above has the following
solution: both types of second-stage innovators invest but, of first-stage innovators, only
those that have ‘high-value’ innovations invest (there are 1− p of these type).
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RL RH
IP v1 + v2 v1 + (1− q)(vH2 )
NIP (1− p)(vH1 + v2) (1− p)(vH1 + v2)
IP - NIP p(vL1 + v
L
2 ) + p(v2 − rL) ≥ 0 p(vL1 + (1− q)vH2 )− (1− p)qvL2
Table 2. Welfare in the Basic Model
Proof. Trivial. 
2.3. Welfare. To determine welfare we need to know the ‘trade-off’ between first and
second-stage innovations that occurs when revenue is allocated from one to the other
by licensing. As stated above, without royalty income from second-stage innovations a
proportion p of first-stage innovations are not produced with average (stand-alone) value
vL1 . The remaining innovations (1−p) are produced irrespective of whether royalty revenue
is received and have average value vH1 .
Let us now consider social welfare in the four possible situations given by (IP, RL),
(IP, RH), (NIP, RL), (NIP,RH) as well as the difference in welfare between an intellec-
tual property regime and a no intellectual property regime (IP-NIP). Due to our ear-
lier assumption welfare is determined by calculating total net value. Define for conve-
nience v1 = pvL1 + (1− p)vH1 , the average first-stage innovator value (if all innovate), and
v2 = qvL2 + (1 − q)vH2 , the average second-stage innovator value (if all innovate). We
summarize the welfare situation in Table 2.
2.4. Policy Implications.
Proposition 2.3. When a low royalty will be set (q ≥ α) an IP regime is optimal.
Proof. In the low royalty (RL) situation all second-stage innovations will be produced
whether there is IP or not. In that case one wishes to maximize returns to the first
innovator and patents do this by transferring rents via licensing. Formally in the low
royalty case the welfare difference between patents and no patents (IP-NIP) is:
p(vL1 + rL) + p(v2 − rL)
Both of the terms in brackets are positive implying that the intellectual property regime
delivers higher welfare than the no intellectual property (NIP) regime. 
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The situation when the high royalty will be set is less clear. First, define β as the
proportion of the royalty payment to a low-value first-stage innovator that would be ‘used
up’ in paying their extra costs:
β ≡ −v
L
1
(1− q)rH
Note that vL1 is negative and must be less in absolute terms than the royalty received
(1 − q)rH as we are assuming that the royalty enables low value first-stage innovators to
produce. Under this definition β = 1 corresponds to the case where all of the royalty paid
to a low-cost first-stage innovator being used to pay their ‘extra’ costs while β ≈ 0 means
all of the royalty payment is being retained as extra profits (and welfare).
Proposition 2.4. When a high royalty will be set (q < α) an intellectual property regime
will be preferable to a no intellectual property (NIP) regime if and only if (NB: in fact
with equality one would be indifferent):
p ≥ qv
L
2 + qv
L
2
(1− β)(1− q)vH2
(2.1)
=
Licensing Failure Cost
Licensing Failure Cost+ Surplus From Extra 1st Stage
(2.2)
Proof. From Table 2 an IP regime yields higher welfare than an NIP regime if and only if:
p(vL1 + (1− q)vH2 ) ≥ (1− p)qvL2
Making p the subject of this inequality and using β we obtain the stated result. 
We represent the import of these propositions graphically in Figure 1, a diagram which
shows optimal policy regions as a function of the exogenous probabilities of low value
first-stage (p) and second-stage (q) innovations.
Remarks: in the high royalty case (RH) q is the proportion of second-stage innovations
that do not occur with intellectual property rights (due to high royalties and the resulting
licensing failure) while p is the proportion of first-stage innovations that do not occur
without intellectual property rights. As first-stage innovations enable second-stage ones
when we lose a first-stage innovation we lose all dependent second-stage ones as well.
Due to this, when β is low for no intellectual property rights to be preferable q must be
substantially higher than p. It is only then that the cost of intellectual property rights, in
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Figure 1. Optimal policy as a function of the probabilities of low value
first-stage (p) and second-stage (q) innovations. α equals 0.7 so to the right
of the line q = 0.7 a low royalty will be set (RL) and an IP regime is optimal.
To the left of that line we have shown three different ‘horizontal’ lines which
demarcate the boundary between IP being optimal (above the line) and no
IP being optimal (below the line). The horizontal lines correspond (in
ascending order) to β (the proportion of royalties used up by first stage-
innovators) equal to 0, 0.5, and 0.99.
terms of lost second-stage innovations, will outweigh the gains in terms of more first-stage
(and dependent second-stage) innovations.
As β increases the area in which no intellectual property rights are preferable will
increase, with the line separating the two regions moving upwards. In the limit as β
tends to 1 – which corresponds to all royalty income being used by a low value first-stage
innovator to pay costs – the marginal p tends to 1, that is, it is optimal to have intellectual
property rights only if all first-stage innovations are of a low value type.
3. A Model of Cumulative Innovation with Sampling
3.1. The Model. The ‘sampling’ model differs from the ‘basic’ model presented in the
previous section only in the addition of a single extra period in which sampling by second-
stage firms takes place prior to any royalty setting. Formally, we have the following
modified sequence of actions (modifications are bolded for clarity):
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(1) Nature determines the value type of the first-stage innovator.
(2) A first-stage innovator decide whether to invest. If the first-stage innovator does
not invest the game ends and all payoffs are zero. Assuming the first-stage inno-
vator invests the game continues.
(3) Second-stage innovators chooses their level of sampling k. (One could
think of this, for example, as the number of first-stage products a second-stage
firms chooses to investigate via purchase, observation etc).
• Sampling has constant marginal cost τ .
• Knowledge of the sampling level chosen by a second-stage firm. There are two
possibilities regarding the knowledge of the sampling level available to first-
stage innovators. In the first case the first-stage innovator does observe the
sampling level. In the second case the first-stage innovator does not observe
the sampling level. In what follows we focus on the case where the sampling
level is unobserved as we feel this is more realistic though the results are
unchanged (and simpler to derive) when it is observed.
(4) The first-stage innovator sets the royalty rate r (under the no/weak IP regime
second-stage innovations do not infringe and so the de facto royalty rate is 0).
(5) Nature determines the value type of a second-stage innovator. As before there are
two types of stage 2 firms, high and low value: vH2 , v
L
2 . However, here:
• The probability, q, that a second-stage firm is low value is a function
of the sampling level: q ≡ q(k).
• Properties of q(k): q′ ≤ 0 (otherwise there is no benefit from sampling). There
are diminishing returns to sampling: q
′′ ≥ 0 and if no sampling takes place all
firms are of low value type (q(0) = 1). The functional form q(k) is assumed
to be common knowledge.
(6) Given this royalty rate second-stage firms decide whether to invest.
(7) Payoffs are realized.
The new action/payoff matrix is shown in Table 3.
3.2. Solving the Model. Define, as in the basic model, a high royalty to be equal to the
value of a high-value second-stage innovation: rH = vH2 , and a low royalty to be equal to
the value of a low-value second-stage innovation: rL = vL2 .
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Player Second-Stage Innovator
Sample (k)
First-Stage
Innovator
Value Type Low (q(k)) High (1-q(k))
Action NI I NI I
Low (p)
r
vL1 , −kτ vL1 + r , vL2 − r − kτ vL1 , −kτ vL1 + r , vH2 − r − kτ
High (1-p) vH1 , −kτ vH1 + r, vL2 − r − kτ vH1 , −kτ vH1 + r , vH2 − r − kτ
Table 3. Action and Payoff Matrix Assuming First-Stage Innovator In-
vests (I/NI = Invest/Do Not Invest, r = Royalty Rate)
We begin with a set of preliminary propositions which detail the players best responses
before moving on to characterise the equilibrium under both (strong) IP and weak/no IP
(NIP).
Proposition 3.1 (Second-stage innovator’s investment strategies). A second-stage inno-
vator with value vX facing a royalty of r will invest if and only if vX ≥ r.
Proof. Just as in the original model second-stage innovator’s move with full knowledge
of all variables. In this case an innovator of type X invests if and only if net profits
from investing, vX − r− kτ are greater than −kτ the payoff from not investing (sampling
costs are sunk). Hence the investment strategies are the same as in the basic model: a
second-stage innovator invests if and only if vX ≥ r. 
Proposition 3.2 (First-stage Best-Response Royalty). Under the IP regime, a first-stage
innovator, whose belief about the sampling level is given by the cdf F (k) and where q¯ =
EF (q(k)), will set a royalty of the form:
r(k) =

rL = vL2 , q¯ > α
rH = vH2 , q¯ < α
mixed strategy (rH , rL) with prob (x, 1− x), x ∈ [0, 1], q¯ = α
where α is as in the basic model, that is the probability such that a first-stage firm is
indifferent between setting a high and a low royalty rate:
α ≡ v
H
2 − vL2
vH2
Proof. See appendix. 
Remark 3.3 (Definition of kα). If a first-stage innovator believes second-stage innovators all
play the same pure strategy, k, then we can replace the conditions of the form q¯ <,=, > α
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with the condition that k >,=, < kα (note the inversion of ordering), where the constant
kα, is the sampling level such that q(kα) = α.
Proposition 3.4 (Second-Stage Sampling Level). Under an IP regime the second-stage
innovators best response to a royalty of r, including ‘composite’ royalties of the form
r = xvH2 +(1−x)vL2 , x ∈ [0, 1] (that is mixed royalty with rH played with probability x), is
as follows:
k =

k2, r ≤ rL = vL2
kr, rL < r < rH
0, r ≥ rH = vH2
where kr is defined implicitly by:14
q′(kr) =
−τ
vH2 − r
And k2 is given as follows:15
k2 = krL = kvL2 ⇒ q
′(k2) =
−τ
vH2 − vL2
Proof. See appendix. 
Theorem 3.5. With intellectual property rights (IP) the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of
the game defined above falls into one of two cases:
(i) Low royalty case (k2 ≤ kα)
(1) First-stage innovators: both high and low value types invest, believe that
second-stage innovators sample at level k2 and set a low royalty rate.
(2) Second-stage innovators: sample at level k2 and both high and low value types
invest.
(ii) Mixed royalty case (k2 > kα)
(1) First-stage innovators: both high and low value types invest, believe that
second-stage innovators sample at level kα and set a mixed royalty rate con-
sisting of a high royalty (rH) with probability xα and a low royalty (rL) with
14If q′(0) > −∞ then for values of r sufficiently close to rH = vH2 this equation will have no solution. In
such cases define kr = 0.
15We use the subscript 2 because this is the level of sampling undertaken when all second-stage innovators
(both high and low types) always.
CUMULATIVE INNOVATION, SAMPLING AND THE HOLD-UP PROBLEM 15
probability (1− xα) where:16
xα = 1− τ−q′(kα)(vH2 − vL2 )
(2) Second-stage innovators: sample at level kα and invest if and only if the
realized value of their innovation is greater than the royalty rate (though the
first-stage innovator is playing a mixed strategy the second-stage innovator
knows the royalty rate with certainty at the point of investment).
Proof. See appendix. 
Proposition 3.6 (Equilibrium under weak/no IP). Under weak/no IP the ‘sampling’
model has the following solution: second-stage innovators sample at level k2 and both types
of second-stage innovators invest. Of first-stage innovators, those that have ‘high-value’
innovations invest (there are 1 − p of these type) and those with ‘low-value’ innovations
do not.
Proof. Trivial. (Second-stage sampling best-response correspondences have already been
derived in Proposition 3.4). 
Remark 3.7. Recall that k2 is the sampling level undertaken by a second-stage firm in the
case when both high and low value second-stage innovators invest (so it occurs either in
the case where there is no IP or when the royalty is sufficiently low). It is also, therefore,
the sampling level which maximizes expected second-stage innovation value and, for that
reason, the socially optimal sampling level.
3.3. Welfare. For the welfare calculations we proceed as in the original model. A pro-
portion p of first-stage innovations are low value (vL1 < 0) and only occur when there
is royalty income. Analogously to the basic model define v1 = pvL1 + (1 − p)vH1 and
v2(k) = −kτ + (1 − q(k))vH2 + q(k)vL2 (the expected value generated by a second-stage
innovator sampling at level k).
Proposition 3.8. [The Optimal Regime in the Low Royalty Case] In the low royalty case
(k2 < kα) it is optimal to have an IP regime (compared to weak/no IP one). Specifically if
16Note examining the definition of k2 shows that kα < k2 guarantees that xα is non-negative.
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the proportion (p) of first-stage innovation that is lost without IP is positive then welfare
is higher with IP (otherwise p = 0 and both regimes generate the same level of welfare).
Proof. See appendix. 
This result has a simple intuition behind it. The low royalty case encompasses the
situation where the sampling level is fairly low even when the royalty rate faced by second-
stage firms is small (k2 ≤ kα) – this may occur because sampling is costly (τ is high) or
generates little benefit (vH2 andv
L
2 are close). As a result most second-stage innovations are
low value and so a first-stage innovator sets a low royalty rate (rL). Hence (a) there is no
‘licensing failure’ and (b) all second-stage firms sample at the optimum rate (k2). Taken
together these mean that, just as with the low royalty case of the simpler model, there
are no costs to having strong IP. Since, thanks to the licensing income, there is more (by
an amount p) first stage innovation under strong IP than under weak/no IP the strong IP
regime is clearly better.
Proposition 3.9. [The Optimal Regime in the Mixed Royalty Case] In the mixed royalty
case (k2 ≥ kα) it is optimal to have an IP regime rather than a weak/no (NIP) regime
if the proportion (p) of first-stage innovation that does not occur under no/weak IP is
sufficiently high, specifically:
p ≥ pm ≡ (v2(k2)− v2(kα)) + xαq(kα)v
L
2
(v2(k2)− v2(kα)) + xαq(kα)vL2 + ((v2(kα)− xαq(kα)vL2 − (−vL1 ))
(3.1)
=
Reduced Sampling Cost+ Licensing Failure Cost
Reduced Sampling Cost+ Licensing Failure Cost+ Surplus from Extra 1st Stage
(3.2)
Proof. See appendix. 
Remark 3.10. Reduced Sampling Cost: v2(k2) is the average value of second-stage inno-
vations when second-stage firms sample at the unrestricted (and optimal) level k2. Under
the IP regime second-stage firms only sample at level kα because of the higher (average)
royalty. Thus, the average value of a second-stage innovation is less under the IP regime
compared to the weak/no IP regime due to this reduced sampling precisely by the amount:
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v2(k2)− v2(kα) (NB: obviously this only applies to those second-stage innovations associ-
ated with the (1 − p) first-stage innovations which are produced under both the IP and
the weak/no IP regime.)
Licensing Failure Cost: licensing failure occurs when a second-stage firm with a low-
value innovation is faced with a high royalty rate. Under the IP regime xα is the probability
that a high royalty is set by a first-stage innovator q(kα is the probability a second-stage
firm has a low-value innovation. Thus xαq(kα) is the probability that licensing failure
occurs and when it does the loss equals the potential value of the second-stage innovation:
vL2 .
Surplus from Extra First-Stage Innovation: the plus side of the IP regime is the extra
first (and dependent) second-stage innovation that happens because first-stage innovators
receive higher incomes. There are a proportion p of low (standalone) value first-stage
innovators, who will only invest under the (strong) IP regime. For each such innovation
the net surplus generated equals the surplus generated by the second-stage firms plus the
net (stand-alone) surplus of a first-stage firm. The expected second-stage surplus equals
the average value if all second-stage firms produced (when sampling at kα: v2(kα), minus
the surplus of those second-stage firms who are held-up: xαq(kα)vL2 . Finally the net
standalone surplus of a first-stage firm is vL1 < 0.
Finally, compare equation (3.1) with equation (2.1) from the basic model. The main,
and most obvious, difference is that, as well as the standard ‘licensing failure cost’ of
(strong) IP, there is another, additional, cost in the form ‘reduced sampling’ (and reduced
average value of second-stage innovations).
Corollary 3.11. Extending pm = 0 to the low royalty case (k2 ≤ kα) by defining pm = 0
if k2 ≤ kα, we have that an IP regime is optimal if p > pm and a weak/no IP is optimal
if p < pm.
3.4. Policy Implications. Since we do not have any precise estimates for the exogenous
parameters such as the sampling cost (τ) or the values of second-stage innovations (vH2
etc) we cannot make direct statements about which regime would yield higher welfare
for a given industry. Instead our approach has been to to pick a ‘dependent’ variable to
focus on (in our case p, the proportion of first-stage innovation ‘lost’ under weak/no IP)
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Figure 2. Marginal pm as a function of sampling cost. Ticks on τ axis
have been specifically omitted as they would be misleading – any particular
value will depend on parametrization, functional form for q etc. However
in this specific case we note that vH2 = 10, v
L
2 = 1.0, q(k) = e
−k and pm = 0
above 8.0.
and then derive the ‘break-even’ or marginal pm such that if p = pm we are indifferent in
welfare terms between the two regimes.
Our next step is to investigate the comparative statics of the marginal p (pm) with
respect to exogenous variables, in particular the cost of sampling (τ) and the relative
value of high (vH2 ) and low type (v
L
2 ) second-stage innovations.
Our general results are summarized in Figure 2 and Figure 3. As we note in the
captions one can only indicate the general form as any specific form for pm will depend
on the functional form for q and of course the values of the other exogenous parameters.
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Figure 3. Marginal pm as a function of vH2 (or equivalently, for fixed v
L
2 :
vL2 − vL2 ). For the same reasons given in relation to Figure 2 ticks on the
vH2 axis have been omitted. However to give the reader some sense of
proportion we note that τ = 0.5, vL2 = 1.0, q(k) = e
−k and pm = 0 below
approximately 3.0.
Proposition 3.12. The sampling levels kα and k2 have the following comparative statics:
dkα
dτ
= 0 (3.3)
dkα
dvH2
< 0 (3.4)
dk2
dτ
< 0 (3.5)
dk2
dvH2
> 0 (3.6)
And taking limits:
lim
τ→∞ k2 = 0, limvH2 →vL+2
k2 = 0, lim
τ→0
k2 =∞, lim
vH2 →∞
k2 =∞ (3.7)
lim
vH2 →∞
kα = 0 (3.8)
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Proof. Recall that we have:
q(kα) =
vH2 − vL2
vH2
q′(k2) =
−τ
vH2 − vL2
Given that q′ < 0 and q′′ > 0 the results following trivially by simple differentiation. 
Remark 3.13. The intuition behind these results is straightforward. kα is the level of
sampling that leaves a first-stage innovator indifferent between charging a high and a
low royalty rate. As such it is a function only of the relative values of the two types of
innovation (and of q) and does not depend on the cost of sampling at all.
The intuition in the second case is a little more complicated. If we increase vH2 keeping
vL2 constant we increase the differential between high and low value second-stage innova-
tions. Then the net change in revenue for a first-stage innovator’s from switching to a
high royalty rate must increase (loss of royalty revenue from low-value second-stage inno-
vations is lower relative to royalty from high-value second-stage innovations). Hence, the
proportion of high value second-stage innovations (1− q(k)) at which the switch to a high
royalty rate is made is smaller and the corresponding level of sampling (kα) is smaller.
Coming to k2, which is the optimal level of sampling (and that performed under a low or
zero royalty), we have unsurprisingly that as the cost of sampling goes down the amount
of sampling goes up. Similarly, an increase in the relative size of a high value innovation
compared to a low value one, increases the benefit of sampling and therefore increases the
amount of sampling done.
Combining the differentials with the limits we have that (a) keeping other variables
fixed there exists a unique finite τ∗ such that for τ < τ∗, k2 > kα and a mixed royalty
is set (conversely for τ > τ∗ a low royalty is set and pm = 0); (b) similarly there exists
a unique v∗ such that for vH2 > v∗, k2 > kα and a mixed royalty is set (conversely for
vH2 < v
H∗
2 a low royalty is set and p
m = 0). This then demonstrates the validity of the
right-hand part of Figure 2 and the left-hand part of Figure 3 where we have pm = 0.
What occurs then if k2 > kα and we are in the mixed royalty case?
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Proposition 3.14. Assuming k2 > kα (i.e. τ sufficiently small or vH2 sufficiently large)
then:
p ≥ pm ≡ (v2(k2)− v2(kα)) + xαq(kα)v
L
2
(v2(k2)− v2(kα)) + xαq(kα)vL2 + ((v2(kα)− xαq(kα)vL2 )− (−vL1 ))
And we have that:
dpm
dτ
< 0
dpm
dvH2
> 0
That is, the marginal level of first-stage innovation lost under weak/no IP (that is the
level such that above this an IP regime is optimal) is (a) decreasing in sampling costs (b)
increasing in the relative size of high value to low value second-stage innovations.
Proof. See appendix. 
Informally this result can be explained as follows. Reductions in sampling costs will
increase the ‘optimal’ level of sampling (k2) relative to the restricted level of sampling
(kα). This in turn increases the cost of intellectual property rights arising from (a) loss
of second-stage innovations due to licensing failure (xα · q(kα)); (b) lower average value of
second-stage innovations (v2(k2)−v2(kα)); while having no effect on the surplus from extra
first-stage innovations under IP. As a result the welfare under weak/no IP rises relative to
the welfare under IP and the marginal p must rise.
Similarly if the relative size of high value second-stage innovation compared to a low
value one rises this (a) increases the ‘optimal’ level of sampling (k2) relative to the re-
stricted level of sampling (kα) (b) directly increases the benefit of sampling. This again
increases the sampling cost and the licensing failure cost but reduces the surplus from
second-stage innovations under IP. As a result welfare under weak/no IP rises relative to
that under IP and the marginal p must rise.
This result then establishes the validity of the rest of Figures 2 and 3 and implies the
following corollaries regarding how the optimal policy regime in relation to intellectual
property rights varies in response to changes in the exogenous environment:
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Corollary 3.15. Reducing sampling costs make it more likely that a freer (weak/no in-
tellectual property rights) regime will be optimal.
Proof. Follows from previous propositions as summarised in Figure 2. 
Corollary 3.16. Increasing the differential between high and low value second-stage in-
novations (which could be interpreted as sampling becoming more important for product
quality) makes it more likely that a freer (no intellectual property rights) regime will be
optimal.
Proof. Follows from previous propositions as summarised in Figure 3. 
Remark 3.17. Most studies of the value of intellectual property rights (copyrights or
patents) indicate that their distribution is highly skewed with a few very high value works
and many low value works. This suggests that vH2 >> v
L
2 .
4. Conclusion
In this paper we have shown how asymmetric information about the value of follow-
on innovations, combined with intellectual property rights such as patents, can result in
licensing failure and hold-up. Presenting the policy decision as a choice between having
or not having intellectual property rights, we have shown that, in contrast to parts of
the previous literature, in some circumstances it may be optimal not to have intellectual
property rights. For whilst intellectual property rights help transfer income from second-
stage to first-stage innovators they can also lead to licensing failure and hold-up with a
resulting reduction in second-stage innovation.
In the first, and simpler, model presented, the basic results were summarized in Figure 1,
which plotted optimal policy as a function of the exogenous variables (the probabilities of
high or low value innovations occurring at the two different innovation stages). Intellectual
property rights in this model had two contrasting effects. On the one hand, there are the
benefits of increased first-stage innovation as revenue is transferred to first-stage innovators
from second-stage ones. On the other hand, there are costs in terms of fewer second-stage
innovations due to licensing failure. In some circumstances the benefits will exceed the
costs and we should have (stronger) intellectual property rights. In other cases, they will
not and we should have weaker (or no) intellectual property rights. In particular, we
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showed that, if the probability of a low value second-stage innovation was high enough
(but not too high), compared to the probability of a low value first-stage innovation, then
a regime without intellectual property rights would be preferable.
Next, we extended this basic model by introducing ‘sampling’. We demonstrated the
existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and showed that (strong) IP may restrict the
level of sampling below what would be socially optimal. Therefore, in addition to the
basic trade-off mentioned above between more first-stage innovations and fewer second-
stage ones, there is the additional factor: those second-stage innovations which occur have
lower average value due to a lower level of sampling. Examining this trade-off, we find that
the lower the cost of sampling and the greater the differential between the low and high
values of second-stage innovations, the more likely it is that a regime without intellectual
property rights will be preferable.
Thus, technological change which reduces the cost of encountering and trialling new
‘ideas’ should imply a reduction in the socially optimal level of intellectual property rights
such as patents and copyright. A perfect case of such technological change in recent years
can be found in the rapid advances in computers and communications. These advances
have, for example, dramatically reduced the cost of accessing and re-using cultural ma-
terial, such as music and film, as well as greatly increasing the number of ‘ideas’ that a
software developer can encounter and trial. Concrete policy actions that could be taken
in line with these conclusions include extending ‘fair-use’ (fair-dealing) provisions in copy-
right law to increase the degree of reuse that would be permitted without the need to seek
permission and excluding software and business methods from patentability.
Finally, we should emphasize that there remains plentiful scope to improve and extend
the present paper. For instance, it was assumed that the non-royalty income for the
first-stage and second-stage innovator was unaffected by the intellectual property rights
regime.17 However this is unlikely to be the case and the model could be improved by the
inclusion of the direct effect of no (or weaker) intellectual property rights on the revenue
of the first-stage (and second-stage) innovator.
It would also be useful to extend the analysis to the case of a continuous distribution
of innovation values, as well as to investigate the consequences of making sampling costs
17As discussed in detail above, while we do allow for business stealing between the first and second-stage
innovators we do not allow for general rent dissipation from wider product market competition.
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a function of the intellectual property rights regime. It would also be valuable to examine
what occurs when the structure of innovation is more complex, for example by having
second-stage inventions incorporate many first-stage innovations (a componentized model)
or having heterogeneity across innovations with some developments used more than others.
Finally, one of the most important extensions would be to properly integrate transaction
costs into the analysis. Transaction costs relating to both the acquisition of information
and the execution of contracts are significant and without them we lack a key element for
the furtherance of our understanding of the process of innovation both in this model and
in general.
A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Proposition 2.1.
Proof. We are considering only subgame perfect nash equilibria so we may begin at the
final stage of the game and work backwards. Given a royalty level of r, at the final stage,
a second-stage innovator of type X faces a payoff of vX2 − r if she invests and 0 if she does
not. Thus, a second-stage innovator, seeking to maximize profits will invest if and only
if vX2 ≥ r (formally, they are indifferent if r = vX2 . However if they do not invest when
vX2 = 0 there will be no equilibrium of the overall game).
Given this, by simple dominance and focusing on pure strategies, a first-stage innovator
must EITHER (a) set a low royalty rate rL = vL2 which will lead to investment by all
second-stage innovations; OR (b) set a high royalty rate rH = vH2 which will result in
investment only by high value second-stage innovations. In the first case the payoff is rL
while in the second it is (1− q)rH . Thus, a low royalty rate should be chosen if and only
if (assuming that if payoffs are equal a low royalty is chosen):
rL ≥ (1− q)rH ⇐⇒ q ≥ rH − rL
rH
= α
Since any mixed royalty strategy must consist of some combination of rL and rH we
have immediately that a proper mixed strategy is only possible when rL = (1− q)rH , that
is if q = α.
Finally, total royalty income to a first-stage innovator is at least rL = vL2 . Thus, total
net income for a low-value first-stage innovator is at least vL1 + rL = v
L
1 + v
L
2 > 0 (by
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assumption) – and net income for a high-value first-stage innovator is obviously greater.
Hence both types of first-stage innovator will invest. 
A.2. Proof of Proposition 3.2.
Proof. Given a first-stage innovator believes F (k), the expected probability that a second-
stage firm is low value is EF (q(k)) = q¯. By subgame perfection a first-stage innovator
knows that, once a seond-stage firm discovers its type, its best response to a given royalty
will be as stated in Proposition 3.1. In particular, if the royalty rate is set to be less
than or equal to the second-stage low value (vL2 ) all second-stage innovators will license,
if a royalty is above this but less than or equal to the second-stage high value (vH2 ) then
only high value firms will license (1− q¯ of them) and if the royalty is higher than this no
second-stage firms will license. Then, letting G(r) be the cumulative distribution function
over royalties representing the first-stage innovator’s mixed strategy, the expected payoff
to a first-stage innovator is:
Π1(G(r)) =
∫ vL2
0
r · dG(r) + (1− q¯)
∫ vH2
vL2
r · dG(r) + 0 ·
∫ ∞
vH2
r · dG(r))
Maximizing with respect to G(r) immediately gives that, just as for the basic model, an
optimal mixed strategy can only consist of some combination of the pure strategy rL = vL2
and the pure strategy rH = vH2 . Let us suppose that these two pure strategies, rH , rL, are
played with probability x, 1− x respectively. Revenue from royalties is then:
rL(1− x) + (1− q¯)rHx = rL + x · ((1− q¯)rH − rL)
Maximizing revenue requires x = 0 if the term in brackets is less than zero, x = 1 if
the term in brackets is greater than 0, and allows any value of x if the term in brackets
is zero. By the definition of α (see above) these conditions correspond precisely to q¯ (the
expected probability of a low value innovation) being less than, greater than or equal to
α. Hence, the first-stage innovator’s royalty response as a function of their belief about
the level of sampling is of the form stated. 
A.3. Proof of Proposition 3.4.
Proof. Using the optimal investment stage determined in Proposition 3.1, for a given
sampling level k, payoffs as a function of the royalty levels are as in Table 4.
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r ≤ rL rL < r < rH r ≥ rH
Π(k) −kτ − r + q(k)vL2 + (1− q(k))vH2 −kτ + (1− q(k))(vH2 − r) −kτ
Table 4. Payoff for Second Stage Innovator
Suppose second-stage innovator plays a strategy given by the cdf F (k) and a first-stage
innovator sets a royalty defined by a cumulative distribution function G(r). Then the
payoff to a second-stage innovator is as follows (where expectations are taken with respect
to F and q is short for q(k)):
Π2(F (k)) = E
(
−τk +
∫ rL
0
qvL2 + (1− q)vH2 − rdG(r) +
∫ rH
rL
(1− q)(vH2 − r)dG(r) +
∫ ∞
rH
0dG(r)
)
= E
(
−τk − q{G(rH)vH2 −G(rL)vL2 −
∫ rH
rL
rdG(r)}+G(rH)vH2 −
∫ rH
0
rdG(r)
)
Claim: Second-stage innovators play pure strategies.
Proof: q is convex so −q is concave. Suppose we have a mixed strategy F (k) with
E(k) = k¯ then −q¯ = E(−q(k)) ≤ −q(k¯) with equality if and only if F (k) is a point
distribution (i.e. corresponds to a pure strategy). Substituting:
Π2(F (k)) = EF (−τk +G(rH)vH2 − q(G(rH)vH2 −G(rL)vL2 )−
∫ rH
0
rdG(r)
= −τ k¯ − q¯ · (+ve) + const
≤ −τ k¯ − q(k¯) · (+ve) + const
(With equality iff and only if F (k) is a point distribution with k = k¯ with probability
1). Thus for any properly mixed strategy F (k) we can always achieve a higher payoff by
playing the pure strategy k¯ = E(k). 
Thus, in what follows we may confine our attention to pure strategies k. Returning to
the payoff function we first note that if royalty (or royalties in a mixed strategy) are all
greater than rH (formally the support of G(r) lies entirely above rH) then the optimal
sampling level is zero (Π2(k) = −kτ).
When this is not the case we have the first order condition is:18
18The second order condition, Π
′′ ≤ 0, is easily checked: Π′′ = −q′′(k) · (+ve) < 0 since, by assumption,
q
′′
(k) > 0.
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q′(k) =
−τ
G(rH)vH2 −G(rL)vL2 −
∫ rH
rL
rdG(r)
For ease of reference define S as the denominator in the previous equation. We shall
look at several special cases as follows:
(i) r ≤ rL. Then G(rH) = G(rL) = 1 and we have S = vH2 − vL2 . The profit-
maximizing k therefore equals k2 where (as defined above):
q′(k2) =
−τ
vH2 − vL2
The intuition here is simple: both firms always invest and pay the royalty. Thus, in
terms of the payoff sampling will only affect the value type and the sampling level
will be chosen so that the marginal gain in terms of lower costs, q′(k)(vH2 − vL2 ),
equals the marginal sampling costs, τ .
(ii) rL < r < rH . Here G(rL) = 0, G(rH) = 1 and we have S = vH2 −r and the optimal
k ≡ kr solves:
q′(kr) =
−τ
vH2 − r
(iii) rH played with probability x and rL with probability (1− x). Then G(rL) = (1−
x), G(rH) = 1. Define the ‘composite’ royalty r = xrH+(1−x)rL = xvH2 +(1−x)vL2
then we have S = vH2 − (1 − x)vL2 − xrH = (1 − x)(vH2 − vL2 ) = vH2 − r. So the
optimal sampling level is k ≡ kr where r is the composite royalty.

A.4. Proof of Theorem 3.5.
Proof. We will solve for a subgame perfect Bayesian nash equilibrium by recursing back-
wards through the game.
In previous propositions we have already derived the best-response correspondences
(where the royalty best-response is defined in terms of beliefs about sampling rather than
the actual sampling level). We have also shown second-stage firms will always play a
pure strategy (i.e. choose a single sampling level). Furthermore, at the sampling stage
all second-stage firms are the same, hence all second-stage firms will choose the same
pure sampling strategy. Thus, a first-stage innovator’s beliefs (to be consistent) must be
single-valued and we may rewrite the royalty best-response correspondence in terms of
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their belief as to the sampling level (k):19
r(k) =

rL = vL2 , k < kα
rH = vH2 , k > kα
mixed strategy (rH , rL) with prob (x, 1− x), x ∈ [0, 1], k = kα
Case 1: k2 ≤ kα. There are three possibilities for the beliefs of a first stage innovator
regarding the sampling level of second-stage firms:
(i) k > kα. Hence the first-stage innovator would set a high royalty rate. Then
second-stage innovator’s best response is k = 0 and beliefs will be inconsistent.
Thus, there cannot be an equilibrium with such beliefs.
(ii) k < kα. In this case the best response of a first-stage innovator is to set a low
royalty (rL) in which case second-stage firm must choose a sampling level k = k2.
Thus, for beliefs to be consistent, a first-stage innovator must believe k = k2 and
the equilibrium is as claimed.
(iii) k = kα. In this case a first-stage innovator’s best response correspondence consists
of all mixed strategies: rH with probability x, rL with probability 1−x for x ∈ [0, 1].
Now a second-stage innovator (if behaving optimally) never samples above the level
k2 and will sample strictly below k2 if the first-stage innovator plays any strategy
in which rH is played with positive probability. Hence if beliefs are to be consistent
we must have (a) k2 = kα and (b) x = 0 (i.e. a low royalty is always set). In such
a case the equilibrium is again as claimed.
Case 2: k2 > kα. There are three possibilities for the beliefs of a first stage innovator
regarding the sampling level of second-stage firms:
(i) k > kα. Just as in the first case this leads to inconsistent beliefs and so cannot be
an equilibrium.
(ii) k < kα. In this case the best response of a first-stage innovator is to set a low
royalty (rL) in which case second-stage firm must choose a sampling level k = k2.
But k2 > kα. Thus, beliefs will be inconsistent and this cannot be an equilibrium.
19At the sampling stage all second-stage firms are the same and their best-response correspondence is single-
valued. Hence all second-stage firms must have the same sampling strategy and a first-stage innovator’s
belief
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(iii) k = kα. In this case a first-stage innovator best response correspondence consists of
all mixed strategies: rH with probability x, rL with probability 1−x for x ∈ [0, 1].
Denote the corresponding composite royalty by r(x) = xrH + (1 − x)rL. Then
for an equilibrium (with consistent beliefs) we must find an x such that the best-
response sampling level equals kα. Formally, using the notation of Proposition 3.4
we must find an x such kr(x) = kα. The best response sampling level is defined
implicitly by:
q′(k) =
−τ
(1− x)(vH2 − vL2 )
Since q′ < 0 we have, denoting k(x) as the implicit solution as a function
of x, that k′(x) < 0 (intuitively a higher average royalty lowers sampling). Since
k(0) = k2 > kα and that k(1) = 0 (as x→ 1 the RHS of the above takes arbitrarily
large negative values), by the intermediate value theorem and the monotonicity of
k(x), there must exist a unique xα ∈ (0, 1) such that k(xα) = kα. Replacing q′(k)
by q′(kα) and rearranging we have as claimed that:
xα = 1− τ−q′(kα)(vH2 − vL2 )
First-stage innovators investment strategy: finally as with our basic model first-
stage innovators of both types invest because with royalty income net profits will be
non-negative. 
A.5. Proof of Proposition 3.8.
Proof. Analogously to the low royalty case in the basic model, in this situation all second-
stage innovators invest so (a) there is no licensing failure (b) second-stage firms sample
at the optimal level (k2). At the same time, intellectual property allows some first-stage
innovators to engage in production who wouldn’t be able to do so otherwise. Hence an IP
regime will deliver higher welfare.
Formally, the welfare difference between the IP and NIP regime is net surplus associated
with the p extra first-stage innovations that occur under IP:
p((vL1 + rL) + (v2(k2)− rL))
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Both the first term (by the assumption that the royalty is sufficient to allow produc-
tion) and the second (since second-stage innovators are making non-negative profits) are
positive. Hence, if p > 0 the sum is positive and welfare is higher with intellectual prop-
erty. 
A.6. Proof of Proposition 3.9.
Proof. In this case comparing the IP to the no/weak IP regime we have the following
differences:
(+) Under IP there are (p) extra first-stage (and dependent second-stage) innovation
because the royalty income allows some first-stage innovators to produce who would
not otherwise:
p (vL1 + v2(kα)− xαq(kα)vL2 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
surplus per extra first stage innovation
(-) For the (1 − p) first-stage innovations that occur under both IP and no/weak
IP there are fewer associated second-stage innovations due to licensing failure
(licensing failure cost) and the innovations are of lower average value due to reduced
sampling (reduced sampling cost):
−(1− p)( (v2(k2)− (v2(kα))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reduced Sampling Cost
+ xαq(kα)vL2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Licensing Failure Cost
)
An IP regime is optimal compared to a weak/no IP (NIP) if the first effect is larger
than the second (and vice versa):
p(vL1 + v2(kα)− xαq(kα)vL2 )− (1− p)(v2(k2)− v2(kα) + xαq(kα)vL2 ) ≥ 0
⇔p ≥ pm ≡ (v2(k2)− v2(kα)) + xαq(kα)v
L
2
(v2(k2)− v2(kα)) + xαq(kα)vL2 + ((v2(kα)− xαq(kα)vL2 )− (−vL1 ))
Where pm has been defined as the probability of a low value first-stage innovation which
leaves one indifferent between having and not having intellectual property rights. 
A.7. Proof of Proposition 3.14.
CUMULATIVE INNOVATION, SAMPLING AND THE HOLD-UP PROBLEM 31
Proof. Define:
S = Higher Sampling Cost = (v2(k2)− v2(kα))
H = Licensing Failure Cost = xαq(kα)vL2
E = Surplus per Extra Stage 1 = v2(kα)− xαq(kα)vL2 − (−vL1 )
Then,
pm =
S +H
S +H + E
Examining the differentials of S,H,E we have:
dS
dτ
=
∂
∂τ
(v2(k2)− v2(kα)) + dv2(k2)
dk2
dk2
dτ
− dv2(kα))
dkα
dkα
dτ
= (−) + (+ · −) + (+ · 0) = −
dH
dτ
=
dxα
dτ
(· · · ) + (· · · )dkα
dτ
= (− ·+) + 0 = −
dE
dτ
=
dE
dkα
dkα
dτ
= (· · · ) · 0 = 0
Similarly,
dS
dvH2
= +
dH
dvH2
= +
dE
dvH2
= −
For the last equation note, that by definition of kα, v2(kα) = (1 + q(kα))vL2 − kατ and
that for k < k2, v′(k) > 0 so that:
dv2(kα)
dvH2
=
∂v2(kα)
∂vH2
+ v′(kα)
dkα
dvH2
= 0 + (+ · −) = −
Putting these derivatives together with the derivative of pm with respect to S,H,E we
have the required result. 
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